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CASE NOTES
Conflict of Laws—Choice of Law—Assumpsit—Torts.—Griffith v. Un-
ited Airlines, Inc.'—In 1961 Hambrecht, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, pur-
chased a United Airlines ticket for a round-trip flight from Philadelphia to
Phoenix, Ariz. On the flight to Phoenix, the airliner crashed in Denver, Colo.,
instantly killing Hambrecht. In 1962, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Survival
Act of 1949,2
 which permits recovery for loss of prospective earnings by a de-
cedent's estate, Griffith, Hambrecht's executor, sued United Airlines in as-
sumpsit, alleging United's breach of contract for safe carriages The Court of
Common Pleas sustained the suit in assumpsit against United applying the
Colorado law of damages. Colorado does not permit recovery for loss of future
earnings,4
 but Pennsylvania does. 5 The court granted the plaintiff leave to
amend his cause of action to conform to the Colorado law. The plaintiff did
not amend his cause of action and the suit was dismissed. From an order
of dismissal the case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
HELD: Remanded for computation of damages in light of the applicable
Pennsylvania law. Pennsylvania, the forum state, had a significant interest in
the outcome of the case while Colorado, the place of injury, had little, if
any, interest in the outcome.
Although the cause of action was in assumpsit, the court on appeal
stated:
[T]he recovery sought is clearly a tort recovery-damages to dece-
dent's estate as a result of decedent's negligently caused death. The
principles which will govern defendant's liability are principles of
negligence, not of contract. . . [A]n action for simple breach of
contract would not and could not justify a substantial recovery by
plaintiff. . . . The choice of law will be the same whether the action
is labeled trespass or assumpsit .5
By this decision, Pennsylvania joins those jurisdictions which favor
the "contacts," "center of gravity," 8 or "significant relationships" 8 theories
governing conflict of laws, thus repudiating the inexorable vested rights
or place of injury rules expounded by the original Restatement of Conflicts
'(1934)."
Under the vested rights or place of injury rule, the law of the place
1 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
2 Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 20, § 320.003 (1950).
3 Griffith simultaneously sued certain employees of United for negligence. The
Court of Common Pleas dismissed the suit against the employees. Griffith v. United
Airlines, supra note 1, at 799.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-1-9 (Supp. 1960).
5 See Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963).
6 Griffith v. United Airlines, supra note I, at 800. Plaintiff's counsel admitted that
the suit in assumpsit was used only to avoid the effect of the Colorado (tort) limitation.
7 See W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 586, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 {1945).
8 Ibid.
9 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 379(1) (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1964).
10 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 377, 378 (1934).
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where the injury occurred was automatically applied and it determined the
outcome of the case. The vested rights approach is well illustrated by
Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll." There, an Alabama resident,
employed by the defendant Alabama corporation, working under a contract
made in Alabama, was injured in Mississippi because of a defective coupling
connection on the defendant's train. Recovery was available under Alabama
law, but not under Mississippi law. The Alabama court denied recovery to
the injured plaintiff holding "there can be no recovery in one State for injuries
to the person sustained in another unless the infliction of the injuries is
actionable under the law of the State in which they were received. 712 This
approach to the choice of applicable tort law was incorporated into the 1934
Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws, which provided, at Section 377:
"The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."'s And at Section 378: "The
law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury.""
Much criticism has been directed at the vested rights rule because its
application does not consider the interests of states other than the one where
the tort occurred.''
Prior to the instant case, many decisions drawn from different areas of
tort law have changed or avoided the rule that only the law of the place of
injury or impact can determine liability in interstate tort situations. Thus,
in Gordon v. Parker," a cause of action for alienation of affections was up-
held in a jurisdiction other than the place of marital domicile even though
the cause of action was abolished in the marital domicile. Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Cal. 17 held that a state where a contract
of employment was entered into could apply its own Iaw to an out-of-state
injury. In Grant v. McAuliffe" a fatal auto accident in Arizona was held
not a bar to a cause of action in California. The reason was that the forum
state, California, construed the survival of the action as a question related to
the administration of the decedent's estate rather than to a normal wrongful
death action which would have been barred in the state where the injury
occurred. The Minnesota court in Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel," applied its
dramshop act to provide a remedy for a Minnesota plaintiff against a
Minnesota liquor seller who illegally sold liquor in Minnesota which resulted
in an automobile accident in Wisconsin. Finally, in Haumschild v. Continental
Cas. Co.,' and Thompson v. Thompson,21 the marital domicile and not the
11 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
12 Id. at 131, 11 So. at 805.
18 Supra note 10.
14 Ibid.
15 See the compilation of commentators criticizing the vested rights rule in 13ahcock
v. Jackson: The Transition From the Lex Loci Delicti Rule to the Dominant Contacts
Approach, 62 Mich, L. Rev. 1358, n.3 (1964).
18 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
17 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
18 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
19 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
20 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
21 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963).
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place of injury was held to determine the capacity of one spouse to sue the
other for a personal tort. In each of the foregoing decisions, the courts rejected
the rigid application of the law of the place of injury and applied instead the
law of the place having the greatest interest or concern in the case.
The facts of the instant case resembled those in Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc.22 In Kilberg, a New York domiciliary boarded a Boston-bound
airplane in New York City. The airplane crashed in Nantucket, Mass.,
killing the decedent. In the resulting suit against Northeast, the New York
Court of Appeals held that, although the cause of action was brought under the
then applicable Massachusetts wrongful death statute, 23 it need not apply
the Massachusetts limitation on damages. 24 The court characterized damages
as procedural, thus avoiding the effect of the Massachusetts statute limiting
the amount of recovery for wrongful death. The New York court, however,
contrary to the instant case, would not permit a suit in assumpsit for breach
of contract when death resulted. 21
Although Kilberg generated much discussion,20 its constitutionality
was upheld in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc." There the Second Circuit
held that a state may develop its own conflict of law rules and need not give
full faith and credit to all provisions of the wrongful death statute of the
state where the injury occurred if it had substantial ties and "a legitimate
constitutional interest in the application of its own rules of law." 2°
After Kilberg, in Babcock v. lackson,29 the New York Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court decision and permitted a New York domiciliary who
was a guest-passenger to sue a New York driver for injuries suffered in an
Ontario automobile accident, even though Ontario had a statute that precluded
a guest-passenger from suing his host. Although a problem of international
law could have arisen, it was avoided by the New York court which held
that New York law, permitting suit by a guest-passenger against a host-
driver, would be applied since New York was "the jurisdiction which has
the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented."3°
While the court in the instant case drew heavily upon Kilberg and
Babcock, it expanded the scope of these cases. In Kilberg, the New York
court justified its decision by separating the impact of the Massachusetts
22 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
ss Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (1958), For later amendments to the statute,
see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229 § 2 (Supp. 1964).
Kilherg v. Northeast Airlines, supra note 22, at 39, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135, 172
N.E.2d at 527. It was against the public policy of New York to limit the amount of
damages in a suit for wrongful death. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 16 (1939).
26 Kilherg v. Northeast Airlines, supra note 22, at 39, 211 N.Y.S. at 135, 172
N.E.2d at 527,
20 For favorable comment on the New York court's characterization of damages
as procedural, see 46 Cornell L.Q. 637 (1961); 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1652 (1961). Contra,
61 Colum. L. Rev. 1497 (1961); 49 Geo. L. J. 768 (1961); 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 723
(1961) ; 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733 (1961) ; 15 Vand. L. Rev. 271 (1961).
27 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir, 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). This was an
action by the estate of another passenger in the Kilberg crash.
28 Id. at 559.
29 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
so Id. at 484, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
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wrongful death statute limitation on the amount of recovery from the cause of
action upon which the suit was premised. In the instant case, the Pennsylvania
court did not distinguish between the cause of action and the amount of
recovery, but merely held that a cause of action in assumpsit for negligent
breach of contract would support a recovery for a tortious death according
to Pennsylvania law." Thus, in Pennsylvania, it now appears that a plaintiff
may sue in assumpsit or trespass for a wrongful death occurring outside the
state.
In Babcock, both the injured guest-plaintiff and host-defendant were
domiciliaries of New York while in the instant case the defendant, United
Airlines, was not a Pennsylvania corporation but merely doing business
there. Babcock also involved a suit in tort while the instant case was a suit
in assumpsit. The New York court in Babcock noted that the defendant
host-driver's automobile was "garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in
New York,"32
 while in the instant case the defendant's airplane was only the
instrumentality through which the business of transporting passengers was
conducted. Compared to Babcock the contacts of the defendant United Airlines
to Pennsylvania were minimal in the instant case while the contacts of the
plaintiff's to the forum state were approximately the same in both cases.
The decision of the court in the instant case follows the view expounded
by the latest Restatement of Conflict of Laws." The pertinent provisions
of the Restatement are Sections 379 and 379a which provide:
Section 379
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties
determines their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in
determining the state of most significant relationship
include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
In determining the relative importance of the contacts,
the forum will consider the issues, the character of the
tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the
interested states."
Section 379a, continues:
In an action for personal injury the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the
ai Griffith v. United Airlines, supra note 1, at 800,
32 Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 29, at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d at
284.
33 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1964).
84 Id. § 379.
( 3 )
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parties, unless some other state has a more significant relation-
ship with the occurrence and the parties as to the particular
issue involved, in which event the local law of the latter state
will govern."
In the instant case, Pennsylvania was interested to the extent that the
decedent was a Pennsylvania domiciliary, the airplane ticket was purchased in
Pennsylvania, and the flight began and was eventually to end in Pennsylvania.
Also because the decedent's family lived in Pennsylvania, compensation for
their loss will have an effect on Pennsylvania. Colorado, on the other hand,
where the death occurred, had no other relationship to either the decedent
or the defendant airline. This decision thus aligns Pennsylvania with the
rapidly growing number of jurisdictions which apply the newer rule based
on "contacts," "center of gravity" or "significant relationships" to their
choice of law problems in conflict of laws.
This newer rule of "contacts," although arguably a cause of "forum
shopping" in which a plaintiff could attempt to sue in that jurisdiction in
which he will receive the largest recovery, merely authorizes the forum
state to apply its own law in a choice of law situation when it has a significant
relationship or interest in the outcome of the action. In the instant case, a
more equitable result was attained using the newer "contacts" rule than
would have been attained if the place of injury rule had been applied by the
Pennsylvania court.
FRANCIS FRASIER
Constitutional Law—Impairment of Obligation of Contract—Impair-
ment by Change of Remedies--Impairment by Exercise of State's Police
Power.—Canal Nat'l Bank v. School Administrative Dist. No. 3 ?—
The Canal National Bank was the holder of bonds issued by a school admin-
istrative district (SAD) which was comprised of eleven Maine towns. Under
existing statutes,2 the bonds were secured by (I) the power of the SAD
to tax the eleven towns and (2) the right of the bank to levy on all
personalty of the residents and on all realty within the eleven-town district.
Subsequent to the issuance of the bonds, the state legislature enacted a
statute, 8 removing three of the eleven towns from the SAD and reorganizing
the SAD to comprise the eight remaining towns. Under this statute, the
bonds were to be secured by (1) the power of the SAD to tax the remaining
eight towns, (2) the right of the bank to levy directly on the property of
the eight towns, and (3) a contingent liability imposed on the three with-
drawn towns if payment in full was not made by levy on all the assets of the
reorganized SAD. The bank brought suit for a declaratory judgment. The
lower court rendered a decision in favor of the bank; and on appeal to the
85
 Id. § 379a.
1
 203 A.2d 734 (Me. 1964).
2 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 41, § 111-K to L; ch. 90A, § 23; ch. 118, § 32 (Supp.
1963) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann, ch. 118, § 30-1.
3 Me. Priv. Sr Sp. Laws 1963, ch. 175.
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